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Abstract
When Austria joined the EU in 1995, it was expected that the Austrian government would increase the Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) budget and organise their aid management more in line with European and international standards. There 
was thus an expectation that Austria would witness a Europeanization of  its development policy. Looking at the situation 
after 20 years of  membership, it seems that Austria took on board the European development rhetoric without a significant 
increase of  the overall ODA budget. Although a more professional Austrian Development Agency (ADA) has been establis-
hed, ODA is still focused more on neighbourhood policy in the Western Balkans and in promoting foreign trade interests in 
the Caucasus region than on poverty reduction in the global south and in delivering contributions to the global public goods. 
Due to the lack of  a strong binding acquis, Austria has been able to hide under the umbrella of  an European Development 
policy with development rhetoric and some adjustment of  implementing structures without any significant financial dis-
bursements. 
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Österreichische Entwicklungspolitik – 
Nachbarschaftspolitik in Europa statt globaler Politik ?
Zusammenfassung
Mit dem Beitritt Österreichs zur EU im Jahr 1995 wurde erwartet, dass Österreich die öffentliche Entwicklungshilfe (ODA) auf  
ein europäisches Niveau anheben und sein EZA Management professionalisieren und mehr in Einklang mit europäischen und 
internationalen Standards bringen wird müssen. Nach 20 Jahren EU Mitgliedschaft lässt sich resümieren, dass Österreich zwar 
die europäische Entwicklungsrhetorik übernommen hat, jedoch seine öffentlichen Entwicklungshilfemittel nicht angehoben 
hat. Trotz der Gründung einer professionellen Österreichische Entwicklungsagentur (ADA) ist die ODA stärker auf Nachbar-
schaftspolitik im westlichen Balkan sowie auf die Stärkung der österreichischen Wirtschaftsinteressen im Kaukasus ausgerich-
tet als auf die Armutsbekämpfung im globalen Süden sowie Beiträge zu den globalen öffentlichen Gütern. Da verbindliche Ver-
träge über die ODA-Leistungen der EU-Mitglieder fehlen, konnte sich Österreich mit Entwicklungsrhetorik und effizienteren 
Managementstrukturen hinter der EU-Entwicklungspolitik verstecken ohne die ODA-Mittel signifikant zu erhöhen.
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1.  Introduction
This paper examines the nature of  Austrian development 
policy since accession to the EU in 1995. We identify a visible 
paradox; that despite a common political acceptance of  
the 0,7% goal amongst all mainstream Austrian political 
parties, development policy has been a more than ‘decade-
long political irrelevance’.  This traditional contradiction 
between rhetoric and policy reality requires us to raise the 
questions: Why is this so? Is there a stronger obligation 
for Austria to close the gap due to EU membership? We are 
therefore interested in the politics behind these decision as 
we have evidence from Switzerland and the UK that even 
in the middle of  the recent economic crisis, ODA levels can 
increase if  there is political will. 
Looking at foreign policy and national interests in 
Austria alongside the legal framework of  the EU, we 
examine the political economy of  Austrian development 
policy. Using a framework of  Europeanization, we explore 
whether Austria’s strategic foreign policy interests in the 
Western Balkans and the Eastern Neighbourhood have 
changed Austrian development policy from a more global 
perspective to a more neighbourhood perspective, thereby 
becoming less aligned with European development policy. It 
examines specific issues such as burden sharing in financing 
for development, following international development 
goals, specific Austrian economic interests in the partner 
countries and security and peace interests before looking 
at the Austrian contribution to policy initiatives at the EU 
level.  The paper examines to what extent Austria has been 
able to influence the EU agenda in the field of  development 
policy and the EU’s top-down influence on Austria’s 
national foreign policy by examining Austria’s actions in 3 
key aspects of  development policy. The article also looks at 
the extent to which Austria is able to forge alliances (both 
ad hoc as well as through more durable partnerships), 
prioritization of  objectives and resources, and drawing on 
EU resources.  The overall argument examines the added 
value of  the Austrian foreign and development policy 
to the EU, with a specific focus on the Western Balkans 
and to a certain extent to the Caucasus. The paper argues 
as well that the shift from a more global perspective to 
a neighbourhood perspective follows the Austrian and 
the European interests. Whilst this might be in line with 
donor states attempting to carve a niche for themselves in 
development policy, it does run counter to the spirit of  the 
EU acquis in this field.
2. Background
Twenty years after the accession of  Austria to the EU it is 
worth looking to see to what extent Austrian development 
policy and development cooperation had changed. In 
particular, we are interested whether there are substantial 
efforts and whether they can be explained by the 
accession to the EU and policy alignment with the 
acquis or are they more closely aligned to activities 
which are of  interest to Austrian Foreign Policy? 
International aid policy was an integrated part of  
the Austrian foreign policy during the government 
of  Bruno Kreisky between 1970 and 1983 in order to 
position Austria as a neutral country, which was able 
to promote and support the interests of  developing 
countries at the UN level (Obrovsky 1993).  Prior to 
accession the policy was characterised as an ambitious 
aid policy which was limited – due to the poor aid 
budget and the fragmented composition of  the total 
ODA – to isolated projects mainly implemented by 
NGOs by technical or/and consultants. The assessment 
of  Austrian EU accession by development experts was 
ambivalent. Big international, humanitarian NGOs 
(i.e. Red Cross, Caritas, Care etc.) were in favour of  
Austrian EU accession because of  the option of  having 
access to European budget lines and of  co-financing 
projects and programmes. Small NGOs were scared 
about the difficult and complex modalities of  applying 
for EC funds. Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC)1 and EU assessments of  the state of  Austrian 
development policy were generally negative (Hödl, 
2013). Assessing the implications of  the Austrian EC 
accession on Austrian development policy, Liebmann 
concluded that we would observe a lot of  different, 
positive impacts on Austrian trade, economic 
and foreign policy and of  course on development 
cooperation. Politicians argued that the low official 
development assistance (ODA) contribution of  
Austria would automatically increase because of  
the contributions to EC budget and the European 
Development Fund (EDF). Liebmann worried that a 
reallocation of  bilateral ODA to the EC budget would 
be the loss of  the Austrian development cooperation 
identity (Liebmann 1993, 126). The most important 
effects on Austrian development policy had been 
expected in financial and administrative terms, also 
because no differences in programming between 
Austria and the EC existed (Michael-Misak 1992, 105). 
For Austrian development policy the main legal 
document is the Federal Act on Development Co-
operation (Republik Österreich 2002, amended 
2003), which provides the following definition of  
development policy: development co-operation shall 
comprise any measure by the Federal Government 
that aims at promoting the sustainable economic 
and social development of  developing countries or 
preventing any impairment of  that development. 
1 The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) is one of  the key 
forums in which the major bilateral donors work together to in-
crease the effectiveness of  their common efforts to support su-
stainable development.
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It sets out three objectives of  development policy: 
(i) combating poverty by promoting economic and 
social development; (ii) ensuring peace and security 
by promoting democracy, rule of  law, human rights 
and good governance; (iii) preserving the environment 
and protecting natural resources that form the basis 
for sustainable development. It also sets out the four 
principles of  development policy: (i) consider the aims 
of  partner country governments and populations; 
(ii) give special regard to culture and the appropriate 
use of  technology for each social environment; (iii) 
gender equality; (iv) needs of  children and people with 
disabilities (Republik Österreich 2002; 2003). 
The common understanding of  development policy 
of  the Austrian Government is still limited to aid and 
humanitarian activities. Despite the inclusion of  policy 
coherence for development in the developmental 
programs and strategies the goals and principles of  
the federal act apply only to the programme of  the 
development agency (ADA). Although the Ministry 
for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs (BMEIA) 
emphasises that development policy is a common task of  
the whole government, activities of  other ministries in 
developing countries, which can be summarized within 
the ODA statistics are not following the principles of  the 
federal act. Therefore the Austrian development policy 
is outsourced to one department of  the BMEIA, without 
the legal power to implement a common Austrian 
development policy. 
3. EU development policy and EU member states 
development policy
Understanding the EU role in the foreign policy of  
member states is an important focus of  much academic 
work. Given that small states constitute a majority of  
states within the EU and thus their influence and actions 
are important (Panke 2010; Wivel/Steinmetz 2010; 
Nasra 2011). As the introduction states the EU treaties 
grant an equal legal status to all member states. Research 
has also focused on small states as donors (Lundsgaarde 
2012). Austria can thus be characterised as ’small’ in 
terms of  both foreign policy and aid policy (Braun 2010; 
Alecu de Flers 2012). 
Europeanization in its basic form relates to the 
impact on EU membership on domestic political actors 
and structures (the so-called downloading), although 
it can also refer to the impact of  member states on the 
EU level (uploading). We use the definition offered  by 
Moumoutzis (2011, 612): Europeanization is defined 
as ‘a process of  incorporation in the logic of  domestic 
discourse, political structures and public policies of  
formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, 
styles, “ways of  doing things” and shared beliefs and 
norms that are first defined in the EU policy processes’. 
In foreign policy terms, the research highlights the 
weakness of  the acquis and therefore highlights the 
role played by socialization (Tonra 2001; Alecu de 
Flers/Müller 2012, 15, Wong 2007). The concept was 
specifically applied to Austrian foreign policy by Alecu 
de Flers (2012, 121-122) who showed that ‘participation 
in the CFSP can be understood as [having] been based on 
cost/benefit analyses and the maximization of  utilities’.  
Development policy is often over-looked in both gen-
eral and EU foreign policy discussions (Orbie/Lightfoot 
2016), but numerous studies show that development as-
sistance is traditionally considered part of  a state’s for-
eign policy toolkit (Lancaster 2007; van der Veen 2011). 
EU Development Cooperation Policy in general was set 
out in Articles 130u-x of  the EC Treaty. The main changes 
introduced by Lisbon were to provide a specific legal ba-
sis for humanitarian aid (TFEU 212-213), whilst develop-
ment cooperation is now included in articles TFEU 208-
211. Article 4 of  the TFEU clarifies that development is a 
shared competence between the Union and the MS, but 
in contrast to other shared competences such as inter-
nal market, agriculture and consumer protection (TFEU 
4.2), it adds explicitly that ‘the exercise of  that compe-
tence shall not result in Member States being prevented 
from exercising theirs’ (TFEU 4.4). EU and MS legisla-
tion could develop ‘side by side’ without affecting each 
other. There is also an explicit commitment to mutual 
complementarity between the EU and the MS, implying 
that neither takes precedence over the other (Broberg 
2011, 545). Therefore, the scope of  EU development pol-
icy acquis tends to form a body of  ‘soft law’ instruments 
that are not binding, ‘but rest solely on their moral force’ 
(Carbone 2007, 50). In the case of  soft law the power of  
the EU over member states is limited and as such the 
Commission must rely on persuasion and socialization 
strategies in order to ensure compliance among member 
states. There are little or no formal mechanisms to en-
sure compliance and in any case the acquis in this field is 
‘soft’, or political rather than legal (Grimm et al. 2012, 7). 
We therefore argue that the socialization model is appli-
cable in this case. To show this we explore both possible 
uploading and downloading. 
4.  The bottom-up dimension of Europeanization – 
Austria’s influence on EU development policy
Austria can be seen as a fence sitter in EU development 
policy, as we are going to show. It tends to react to EU 
level policies. There has been some attempt to influence 
policy towards western Balkans, a key strategic interest 
of  Austria’s but only in conjunction with other states 
(Bechev 2006). To this end Austria has forged alliances 
to try and promote important objectives through forg-
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ing strategic partnerships/alliances with other member 
states/EU actors (Alecu de Flers 2012). It tends to follow 
Germany and other big states (Pospisil/Khittel 2010, 
130). Austria has developed some concentration in se-
curity/conflict prevention, explicitly linked to develop-
ment policy (Pospisil/Khittel 2010). 
During the Austrian presidency of  the EU in 2006, 
Austria added the energy-development interface to the 
EU agenda. The major contribution was to organise con-
ferences and encourage more work among members on 
sustainable development (OECD 2009).  In line with the 
Paris Declaration and the Aid Effectiveness discourse 
Austria emphasised during the presidency the creation 
of  a development cooperation administration in the new 
member states in order to be able to deliver more effec-
tive aid (BMaA 2006, 61). Austria has also been very ac-
tive in promoting the European perspective for the West-
ern Balkan states, which was one of  key priorities for its 
presidency in 2006 (Pomorska 2012). It has brought the 
Balkans back on the agenda, in particular through rais-
ing the issue of  security co-operation (O’Brennan 2014). 
Despite the relatively low public support for further en-
largement (29%), with the support of  Hungary and Slo-
venia, it secured a so-called ‘Salzburg Declaration’ on 11 
March 2006, mentioning the future membership of  Ser-
bia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Albania and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (Pollak/Puntscher Riekmann 2007, 11). The 
document was later endorsed by the European Council. 
Apart from this foreign policy initiative both Austrian 
presidencies were not characterised by strong develop-
mental initiatives in terms of  global development. Over-
all the discussion of  Austrian influence over EU agenda 
reflects the argument that development policy is a ‘weak 
sector’ in Austria.
5. The top-down dimension of Europeanization
The limited literature on Austrian development policy 
highlights the pressure from the EU on Austria to ensure 
its development policy conformed to EU norms and pri-
orities (Hödl 2013, 274). Therefore we see clear potential 
for top-down mode of  Europeanization. If  we examine 
key aspects of  the acquis in the field of  development 
policy we can see EU influence, albeit with some cave-
ats. On issues such as ODA untying aid and aid effec-
tiveness we see shallow Europeanization in the case of  
Austria. From a developmental perspective the question 
raised is whether the specific Austrian profit of  the EU 
membership – in financial terms and in political terms 
– is reflected in the Austrian development  policy and 
development cooperation. To analyse the shifts in Aus-
trian policy and in development cooperation since 1995 
we analyse three different aspects: the ODA quantity in 
relation to the DAC and the DAC EU Member Country-
average; the administration structure; and the aid effec-
tiveness agenda.
5.1 Official development assistance – ODA
A key element of  the soft acquis is the decision of  the 
European Council in Barcelona 2002 (Council of  the EU 
2002) to increase ODA of  the EU-15 states to the target 
of  0,7% GNI by 2015. To meet the target demands an an-
nual ODA budgetary plan, which addresses goals and 
objectives in the future. Taking into consideration that 
the budget reflects policy, looking at the ODA flows show 
how policy decisions were translated into aid activities 
and how seriously EU Council decisions are implement-
ed by the Austrian government.
Graph 1 shows that ODA increased in 1995 significantly 
from 323 m US$ (1990) to 620 m US$.  This increase is 
based on additional contributions to EC budget and EFF 
(84 mill US$). In reality the increase was not as big as the 
data show because due to a revision of  the data between 
1990 and 2000. After 2000 the total ODA dropped 
again to 440 m US$. If  you take into consideration the 
amount for the EU budget and the EFF (87 m US$) and 
increased debt reduction there has been no additional 
increase since 1994. Between 2001 and 2008 there are 
several peeks in the ODA data (2005, 2007, 2008) but 
these peeks in Austrian ODA performance can be ex-
plained by the reporting of   debt reduction as ODA, 
which although  in accordance with the DAC reporting 
rules does help to boost national ODA statistics. The EU 
ODA-contributions are calculated as a part of  the overall 
EU contribution of  an EU member and are reported by 
the member country. Therefore this is an obligatory con-
tribution linked to the economic situation of  a country 
and not a grant on a voluntary basis i.e. it forms a sort of  
membership fee. Therefore this linear increase of  the EU 
contributions shows the unintentional Europeanization 
Source: based on DAC Stat online
Graph 1: Official development assistance (ODA) of Austria 
in m US $ 1990 - 2014
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of  the Austrian development cooperation because the 
amount spent on EU institutions far exceeds the money 
spent on national programmes.
Comparing the quantity of  ODA of  Austria with the 
average of  the DAC EU-Member Countries the graph 
shows that Austria started in 1995 with 0,27% of  GNI as 
ODA and has reached in 2014 with 0,28% more or less 
the same ODA quota than 19 years before. The distance 
between the lines of  Austria and the DAC EU-Member 
Countries has increased since Austrian EU accession. 
Compared with Finland – one of  the other new EU mem-
ber states in 1995 – there is more a linear development 
up to 0,60% of  GNI as ODA in 2014, despite of  financial 
crises in 2008. Austria therefore did not follow the gen-
eral trend to increase ODA post 2000. Due to the com-
position of  the Austrian ODA (i.e. high amounts of  debt 
reduction, costs for asylum seekers, imputed student 
costs and low core budgets for programmable aid) ODA 
is too volatile to be accordance with the strategy of  the 
EU Council. In quantitative terms, Austria even lags far 
behind Ireland, which started in 1995 on a similar ODA 
level than Austria in 1995 although Ireland cut their 
ODA because of  the finance crisis in 2008. 
Whilst EU membership has not lead to an  increase of  
ODA, EU membership did  impact upon the distribution 
of  development spending with almost four times more 
of  the budget spent on EU development cooperation 
than on Austrian development cooperation.
Austria remains part of  a large middle group of  coun-
tries labeled fence sitters without a prospect to reach the 
0,7% target.  Interestingly Austria failed to sign up to 
this long term target in 2002 (Carbone 2007, 74).  Thus, 
after ten years of  benchmarking, monitoring and peer 
pressurizing (socialization), it is hard to find any evi-
dence of  Europeanization. Carbone argues that Austria 
can be increasingly grouped with southern states when 
it comes to development policy (Carbone 2007, 42). We 
agree with the overall conclusion but argue that we must 
look beyond the budget cuts. Rather we need to focus on 
the extremely low core aid budget. Austria is not pro-
viding aid to priority countries at levels consistent with 
those of  similarly prosperous EU countries (e.g. Ireland, 
Sweden, Belgium, and Denmark), undermining its pro-
file among donors and in national policy dialogue (DAC 
2009). 
Domestic politics is a key element in understanding 
decisions related to aid policy (Lundsgaarde 2013). Ac-
cording to DAC peer review the Austrian Government 
therefore has public support for meeting its EU aid com-
mitments. Yet, according to Austrian NGOs and opinion 
leaders, ‘strong individual solidarity in Austria does 
not translate into solidarity at the political level’ (DAC 
2009). Indeed Hödl (2013) argues that development aid 
is a ‚marginalised subject within the political debate‘. 
Although Austrian developmental NGOs actively sup-
port and lobby their politicians for more aid in public 
debates, they are also highly reliant on the Austrian 
state for funding. In addition, the media does not give 
development issues a high profile (Hödl 2013, 276). Hödl 
(2013) shows that there is no dissent between the main 
parties on the rhetorical commitment to the 0.7% ODA 
target. However, successive governments – paralyzed 
by the right wing party – persist in announcements and 
commitments without ensuring budgetary means. Pub-
lic opinion and NGO positions are reinforced by a lack 
of  pressure from the private sector. SMEs are seen not 
to be that interested in overseas export markets (with 
the exception of  SE Europe) plus there is a general lack 
of  transnational corporations. Both factors according 
to Hödl (2013) help reinforce the lack of  pressure on the 
government.
Beyond the international pressure on defaulting 
donors by international stakeholders (i.e. DAC) by 
naming and shaming does not work anymore. The bad 
Source: based on DAC Stat online
Graph 2: ODA comparison of DAC EU-members average of 
Austria, Finland, and Ireland in % of GNI 1990 - 2014
Source: DAC Stat online, own calculations
Graph 3: Core budget for programmes and projects 
between 1990 and 2014 in m € 
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ODA performance of  Austria has no news value at all, 
therefore the annual ranking of  donors is of  no specific 
media interest, as long as Austria is not the worst culprit. 
Public relation departments of   the BMEIA and ADA 
are providing success stories and new announcements 
and commitments in order to create a positive public 
opinion. As long as the marginalisation of  development 
policy does not have any national or international 
political or economic consequences  there is no need 
for Austrian politicians to increase ODA efforts. With 
reference to many other European countries, which 
have not fulfilled the ODA target Austria even hides 
behind the EU and argues that we – as member of  
the EU – belong to the biggest donor community of  
international stakeholders. 
Despite the general weakness of  its aid policy, Aus-
tria had held a positive image amongst recipient states. It 
was seen to be a trusted donor, in part due to the foreign 
policy position of  neutrality (Pospisil/Khittel 2010), ‘an 
alliance-free’ one (Hauser 2006, 211). Taking into consid-
eration the positive image Austria had amongst recipi-
ent countries prior to accession (Pospisil/Khittel 2010), 
the fact that political rhetoric  were not accompanied by 
financial means and  support has jeopardised this im-
age.  Austria still benefits from its neutrality status, but 
since 1995 this argument is not as strong as during the 
cold war, because many recipient countries do not need 
a facilitator any longer. 
5.2 The administration of development policy and 
 development cooperation
There are several institutional models for organizing a 
country’s international development policy. Lancaster 
(2007, 19) argues that aid fragmentation in government 
equals weak development purpose in government aid 
programmes. This weakness is visible in Austrian devel-
opment policy. The transfer of  the aid management from 
the Federal Chancellery to the Ministry of  Foreign Af-
fairs (MFA) in 1985 was introduced as a political upgrad-
ing because a department dealing with development was 
established in the MFA for the first time. It was argued 
that the incorporation of  aid in the MFA as a part of  For-
eign Policy and with an own department gives aid more 
importance and visibility within foreign policy (Höll 
1986, 148). One change that is important is the change in 
responsibility within the MFA. From 1995, the director-
ate was managed by a Secretary of  State, but since 2000, 
it is now under the direct authority of  the Federal Min-
ister for Foreign Affairs (Obrovsky 2005). Despite these 
frequent changes during the past decades, most of  the 
staff (experts, civil servants, and even top- and middle-
tier diplomats) remained in place. This explains a cer-
tain continuity of  the priorities of  the co-operation pro-
gramme and the priority countries, without large-scale 
changes taking place every time political responsibility 
was transferred.
Taking into consideration the fact that the interest of  
the conservative party ÖVP in development cooperation 
was more driven by the interest of  linking development 
cooperation with Austrian economic interests it is not 
surprising that the Austrian Development Agency (ADA) 
was established in 2004 during the Schüssel II govern-
ment. The outsourcing of  the management of  develop-
ment cooperation to a private company which is held by 
the MFA was in line with the general public administra-
tion reform in order to reduce administration costs and 
to organise management activities more effectively. De-
spite some general critique of  the neoliberal concept of  
outsourcing of  public administration, the establishment 
of  ADA was significant because it brought together a 
team of  experts who were focussed on aid delivery based 
on a political commitment in the context of  the MDGs. 
The establishment of  ADA is - to a certain extent - the 
political and structural answer to the decisions of  the 
European Council in Barcelona 2002 to increase ODA in 
order to fulfil the Millennium Development Goal 8 and 
to create a professional agency in order to be fit for par-
ticipate in other instruments and means of  development 
cooperation (Breier/Wenger 2008). The idea to separate 
development policy – which is still the mandate of  the 
MFA - and the management of  the implementation 
of  programmes and projects followed the example of  
other European donors (i.e. Germany) and was installed 
in order to be ready to implement the internationally 
committed 0,7% of  GNI ODA target. Unfortunately 
the establishment of  ADA was not accompanied by the 
strengthening of  the capacity of  MFA in order to fulfil 
the mandate of  following the international development 
policy and deduce specific Austrian policies. Therefore 
we see a capacities gap between the policy division and 
the implementing agency (Breier, Wenger 2008).
ADA (2010) sees itself  as an actor within the 
international development community. This includes 
cooperation with international organisations, other 
donors and with the European Union. Since the 
foundation of  ADA the fields of  cooperation have 
been expanded from NGO-co-financing (specifically 
in development education) to implementing EU-funds 
and programmes in partner countries, which ADA 
has been eligible to apply for since 2009 (ADA 2010). 
Seven programmes of  the European Commission are 
recently implemented by the ADA with a total amount 
of  61m € (ADA 2014). There is one programme for socio- 
economic development in Serbia, one programme in 
Uganda dealing with supply of  water and waste water 
disposal and another programme in Albania dealing 
with water reform (ADA 2014). This shows that ADA 
– due to the continued lack of  an increase of  the MFA 
budget and other national public budgets – offered 
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successfully their services to EU and other donors (i.e. 
Swiss, Liechtenstein) to increase the total turnover in 
order to legitimate a national Austrian aid agency. EU 
funds are used to underline the experience and specific 
knowledge of  ADA and to keep experts in specific areas.
In terms of  division of  labour ADA - in accordance 
with the MFA - has the mandate to negotiate with partner 
countries, other donors and international organisations 
what forms of  aid and what instruments are effective 
and who is going to deliver the appropriate coopera-
tion programme. Therefore ADA is – in specific Aus-
trian focus countries – a partner of  the EU commission 
and the other EU donor countries. The main structural 
problem is that ADA covers only 10% of  the total ODA. 
That means that the rest of  the ODA is not following in 
detail the principles and guidelines of  the development 
policy. Although the MFA has the mandate to coordinate 
development policy with other policies, which effect 
developing countries, PCD instruments are not estab-
lished to fulfil PCD effectively (Obrovsky/Schlögl 2011; 
OECD 2015). As the DAC concluded in the Peer Review 
2015: ‘Austria does not have a clear approach to address-
ing policy incoherence. This prevents Austria from fully 
translating its political commitment into practice and 
actual policy changes’ (OECD 2015). This issue will be 
addressed in more detail in the next section.
5.3 Aid effectiveness?
A key element of  the soft acquis is the aid effectiveness 
agenda, whereby states commit to ensuring their aid pol-
icies are coordinated with and complimentary to those 
of  other donors and their other policy areas are coherent 
with development aims. In this section we take a range 
of  indicators and examine Austria’s performance, such 
as reducing the number of  countries and sectors sup-
ported in order to avoid fragmentation. Austria aims to 
focus on Poverty reduction; Peace and human security; 
preserving the environment (Devt Act).
Prior to accession we see that Austrian development 
cooperation focused on 8 focus countries in the global 
south, yet post accession we see a general shift towards 
CEE states, the Western Balkans and the Caucuses be-
cause of  political or/and economic priorities, and be-
cause of  the need to align with EU priorities.  In the case 
of  the South East European Countries we see an align-
ment of  EU and Austrian interests. The geographical 
split was reflected in the administration of  ODA until 
2000, when both departments were put together in the 
Department of  Development Cooperation (DDC) within 
the MFA. This separation raised concerns in the devel-
opment cooperation community, which were afraid that 
the cooperation with the South could easily be replaced 
by the cooperation with eastern countries in accordance 
with economic interests instead of  following the main 
purpose of  the South cooperation poverty reduction. Al-
though the split was resolved in organisation terms, the 
contradiction between focus countries and real recipient 
countries, which was the result of  the fragmentation and 
many different aid spending ministries, was not solved 
until 2013. This was despite DAC criticisms in every peer 
review. In 2015 DAC still recommended: ‘Austria should 
bring all aid-spending ministries in line with, and make 
them accountable for, achieving the objectives of  the 
three-year programmes’ (DAC 2015, 15).
When ADA was founded in 2004 it was tasked to 
bring together the different objectives and goals of  
south and CEEC cooperation. In 2005 the DAC’s ODA 
eligible list of  countries was re-written to reflect the fact 
that many countries of  CEES and NIS had become more 
prosperous or joined the European Union.  By that time 
we see the shift to include South East European states 
(Albania, Bosnia & Hercegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, 
Serbia and Montenegro inclusive Kosovo) in the bud-
get of  ADA and started to increase the disbursements 
to South East Europe. In 2004 Austria started a co-op-
eration with Moldova, and in 2006 the focus had been 
expanded to the South Caucasus, and especially Georgia 
and Armenia (BMEIA 2006). A close coordination with 
the EU neighbourhood program is mentioned in the 
MFA strategy (BMEIA 2006, 30). It therefore strikes us 
that the timing was good for reorientation and that Aus-
tria’s adjustment in line with EU priority was a stroke of  
political good fortune, although Africa is still the main 
Focus of  ADA (Uganda, 11.8m €; Ethiopia, 6.4m € and 
Mozambique 5.8m €).
Although country strategies and regional strategies 
are established by the ADA and the MFA, a whole of  
government approach is still missing and results based 
management of  aid delivery is far from being imple-
mented. The DAC recommended in the recent Peer Re-
view that ‘Austria is encouraged to develop a consistent 
and coherent approach to development results as well 
as a system to inform programming decisions and serve 
accountability needs’ (DAC 2015, 19). This shows how far 
Austria is from the soft law norms set down by the EU 
and how limited EU power is in the area.
There is also a commitment to making increased 
use of  the budget support modality and increasing 
recipient ownership. According to the DAC ‘some of  
Austria‘s stated commitments to the aid effectiveness 
agenda seem very cautious’ (DAC 2009). They highlight 
two examples: the decision to concentrate aid in fewer 
countries and the commitment to budget support. In the 
Austrian perspective Austria already has concentrated 
their aid (i.e. ADA budget) to fewer countries but in the 
DAC perspective total ODA recipients are still too many. 
The commitment to deliver more budget support has 
not been realised because without a substantial budget 
increase there is no additional budget available for 
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budget support without cutting the budgets for NGOs, 
humanitarian organisations and other implementing 
organisations. The DAC has questioned whether the 
commitment to allocate 10-15% of  ADA‘s budget as 
budget support is too low.
We also examine Austria against the aim of  unty-
ing aid, the policy by which aid provision is not “tied” 
to the recipient state using the aid money to buy goods 
and service from the donor country; European Consen-
sus 2006). Austria made good progress in untying its aid, 
increasing the share of  its untied aid from 39% in 2005 
to 68% in 2009 but this trend turned again and the share 
of  untied aid declined from 58% in 2010 to 37% in 2012. 
Traditionally, the share of  Austrian aid that is untied has 
been boosted by high levels of  debt forgiveness which, 
by convention, is regarded as untied aid. The fact that 
debt reduction for South Sudan is not yet included ODA 
reporting influences both the total volume of  Austrian 
ODA as well as the quality in terms of  untying. DAC 
concluded therefore: ‘Austria was one of  few countries 
which did not meet the Accra commitment to provide 
a clear plan for untying a significant share of  remain-
ing tied aid’ (DAC 2015, 61). However that still falls along 
way short of  most other EU-15 donors and puts Austria 
in with the Southern European states (again). In part this 
is due to the fragmented nature of  Austrian aid system 
and the weakness of  the MFA in the policy sector.
Increasing policy coherence for development) is rec-
ognised by the donor community and hence the EU as 
one of  the most important issues to be tackled in order 
to make aid more effective; OECD DAC states ‘Policy 
coherence for development has grown in significance 
in Austria since it appeared on the EU agenda in 2001’. 
The MFA tries to participate in various international 
networks, including the EU and the OECD, though it 
lacks capacity in this respect. The European discussion 
in 2001 about the 3Cs (co-ordination, collaboration, co-
herence) was an important moment in Austria’s concep-
tual thinking about policy coherence for development. 
In 2005, the EU Consensus on Development became 
an important frame of  reference for Austria regarding 
policy coherence for development. The rolling EU work 
program requires regular reporting by member states of  
their progress and record on policy coherence for devel-
opment. The Austrian three-year program still refers to 
the 3Cs when discussing Austria’s contribution to EU de-
velopment policy. 3C approach is established in papers 
of  security and development – in specific in the strategic 
guidelines of  security and development (BMEIA 2011) - 
but it is not implemented in all areas, again highlighting 
the weakness of  EU pressure.
Aid Effectiveness is another way to explore the po-
litical effort in delivering aid alongside the quantitative 
commitment. If  development co-operation is imple-
mented in a more effective way this shows that the gov-
ernment tries to put more emphasis on managing aid. If  
there is no effort in quantitative terms but a lot of  sig-
nificant effort in effective delivering of  aid this shows 
some budgetary constraints but a general commitment 
to a European strategy based on at least a Europeanized 
Management. The European Commission has proposed 
a number of  policy documents and actions to improve 
aid and development effectiveness at the European level. 
These documents were agreed by the member states of  
the EU (Commission 2006). But at the end of  the day 
– in terms of  development – money matters. An Euro-
peanized effective aid management without significant 
financial means remains a lame duck with no perspec-
tive to take off. Therefore ADA is ready for delivering aid 
– without significant financial means their contribution 
to the EU development cooperation remains negligible.
6. Conclusion
Being a donor was imposed upon Austria by EU mem-
bership. In terms of  development cooperation, like 
many other policy areas, this is not unusual – the price 
for EU membership is that a state must adhere to the 
rules of  the game. Austria saw EU development policy 
as an external framework it had to accept to join the EU. 
Austria took the economic advantages of  the accession 
to the EU, but, and here we support Gerald Hödl – whilst 
the EU development policy was ‘established together 
with the DAC certain norms ‘it could not prevent a small 
country like Austria from keeping its ODA efforts at a 
minimum’ (Hödl 2013). This shows that the EU system of  
socialization or the international system of  naming and 
shaming with DAC statistics is not working. Austrian 
political will is limited because – due to the soft law of  
EU acquis and the lack of  consequences – the repetition 
of  the ODA commitments replaced the implementation. 
The idea behind our argument is that the decision not to 
increase the ODA follows a specific political economy, 
because without any sanctions and consequences there 
is no need to increase ODA in the future. Austria has to 
pay increased fees to EU but as a small country Austria is 
not bound to fulfil international commitments in detail 
as long as France, Germany and other big players fail. 
Therefore Austria’s multilateral contributions to the 
EU budget and to the EEF went up but not as a result of  
political decisions. The EU has established an additional 
multilateral aid architecture (which is to a certain extent 
more binding than DAC and UN) but at the end the EU is 
not able to force their members to fulfil their commit-
ments, reflecting the shallow nature of  the acquis. In our 
perspective the EU offers a framework to hide, because 
Austria (and others) can argue that Austria – as a mem-
ber of  the EU – belongs to the biggest donor group to de-
veloping world.
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The current Austrian Commissioner Johannes Hahn 
(Neighbourhood policy and Enlargement) summarized 
in a press bulletin that 20 years of  Austrian membership 
are a success story (Hahn 2015). This article showed that 
in regard of  development diplomacy this holds true in 
a European but not in a global perspective. In terms of  
development cooperation Austria did neither establish 
an own national approach nor took the European one. 
Thus we see ‘shallow’ Europeanization in Austria where-
by rhetorical engagement with the EU acquis is evident 
but the engagement goes little beyond that. Linking to 
the framework we see seeking benefits: Austria adapts 
the political rhetoric without implementing structures 
and providing financial means. This gives more national 
political space without too much obligations. Although 
Austrian politicians committed themselves to the in-
ternational 0.7% ODA goal they never put in place solid 
structures to realise this commitment. In quantitative 
terms a silent Europeanization took place because Aus-
tria delivers much more money to European develop-
ment instruments than to the ADA budget and bilateral 
programmes and projects. Without a proper national 
development programme and a significant ODA per-
formance there are doubts if  Austria is recognised as 
a European donor at all – neither in Europe nor by our 
partner countries in the global South.
In terms of  foreign policy interests Austria squan-
dered the potential development policy and develop-
ment cooperation offers to position - in specific - a small 
country like Austria as an important player in the global 
context.  Even if  we take into consideration that small 
countries need to find their niches and deliver specific 
contributions focussed on small partner countries the 
foundation of  ADA and the focus on the Western Balkan 
countries was an important step into the right direction 
but without delivering significant means and a broad 
political consensus to development policy and foreign 
policy it is a weak political performance that under-
mines Austrian credibility as well on an European level 
as in partner countries in the global South. Overall, we 
argue that there has only been shallow Europeanization 
in the context of  Austrian development policy. Given the 
closeness of  development policy to foreign policy goals 
in the Austrian case this conclusion is perhaps not that 
surprising. However, we also show that Austria is unable 
to upload its foreign policy preferences without the sup-
port of  larger member states. Austrian aid lacks the po-
litical will to push it in the direction of  the more global 
direction called for by the EU acquis and to a large ex-
tent, as it supports the national interest, this situation is 
unlikely to change in the near future.
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